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 Externalities as Commodities: Comment
 By ITALBOT PAGE AND JOHN FEREJOHN*
 In this Review in 1967, F. Trenerv Dolbear
 constructed a sinmple general equilibrium
 model which demonstrated, among other
 things, that I'igouvian unit effluent taxes
 could not be expected to be both Pareto op-
 timal and exactly compensatory to pollution
 sufferers. Calling this result Dolbear's
 "negative conclusion," Robert Meyer set
 out in his 1971 article to generalize Dolbear's
 model and derive conditions under which
 Pigouvian taxes would achieve both goals si-
 multaneousl v.
 MVev-er established a test which he asserted
 would tell us when both goals are attainable
 simultaneously. And Meyer suggested that
 when Pigouvian taxes are unable to achieve
 both goals simultaneously, the failure is the
 result of some sort of nonconvexity, p. 737.
 The purpose of this note is first to point out
 that Meyer is mistaken in thinking that the
 source of Dolbear's negative conclusion is in
 lack of convexitv conditions and then to
 point out some of the role convexity actually
 plays in pollution problems.
 I. Necessity of Two Instruments
 One might wonder how a single policy in-
 strumllent, I'igoouvian per unit taxes, could be
 expected to achieve two disparate policy
 goals, except fortuitously. And indeed the
 reason for Dolbear's negative conclusion is
 the necessity for two policN instrumnents and
 not sonme problem with convexityX. Dolbear's
 imiodel is well behaved with respect to con-
 vexitv conditions, as can be seeni by the in-
 difference curves and production possibility
 frontier of his diagram.
 In Dolbear's nmodel there are two con-
 sumers. Consumer X divides his inconme be-
 tween bread and heat and Y spends all his
 income on bread. In direct proportion to X's
 consumllption of heat, smoke is produced
 which Y involuntaril and distastefully con-
 sumes. We limit ourselves to the case where
 we start with an endowment of OB bread for
 X and BF bread for Y. The model is driven
 bv X who can trade bread for heat, inciden-
 tally increasing V's consumption of smoke
 (in units heat). The role of Y is completely
 passive: he consumes just the bread he was
 endowed with and the smoke blown his way.
 Inside the production possibility set, which
 is also an Edgeworth triangle, indifference
 curves are drawn for X and '2 Points of
 tangency of indifference curves form the con-
 ventional "contract" curve CC'. With initial
 endowment B, X will trade himself down to
 E1, carrvina F to OJ1 units of smoke con-
 sumiiption will-nillyN and leaving Y's bread
 consumption unchanged. A Pigouvian efflu-
 ent tax, whose revenue goes to Y in units of
 comnpensatory bread, steepens X's effective
 budget constraint. Relative to initial endow-
 ment B, different Pigouvian tax rates trace
 out l's "price consump)tion" curve PP'.
 Y's indifference curve through B specifies
 the exact compensation requirements. Clearly,
 it will not in general happen that BB', PP',
 and CC' intersect at the same point, in which
 case a Piigouvian tax could be both Pareto
 optimal and exactly compensatory. By the
 geonietr\, the exceptional case can onlx hap-
 pen at corner solutions or if l''s relevant in-
 (lifference curve is a straight line segment.
 There are two considerations in our argu-
 miient that Pigouvian taxes alone cannot be
 expected to achieve efficiency and comipensa-
 tion simultaneously. The first is basicallx- * Research associate at Resources for the Future,
 Inc., Washington, I).C., an(d assistant professor of
 p)olitical scienice at California Institute of Technology,
 res)ectivelv. We wvish to thank Roger Noll an(d R"alph
 (I'Arge for helpful comments.
 EI xact comp)ensation for a )ollutant leaves a l)oten-
 tial pollution sufferer indifferent between the pollutant's
 p)rohibition and its allowance with compensation.
 2 The origin for X's indifference curves is 0; the
 origin for l's indlifferenice curves is F. 'IThe allocation
 )oint Ei specifies T1/R1 bread to l anldI EJ1 l)read to X;
 OJ, smoke to F and OJ, heat to X. In the diagram, F
 is indifferent between (R11<l l)rea(d, OJI smoke) and
 (R2F12 bread, 02F12 smoke).
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 definitional. It is customary to think of a
 Pigouvian tax as having just a single degree
 of freedom, the rate itself. In Dolbear's model
 the set of possible Pigouvian taxes is specified
 by line segments hinged at B and falling be-
 tween 0 and G. In a model of onlv two
 people, setting the tax rate for the polluter
 also determines the distribution of the pro-
 ceeds for both participants. With a model
 more complicated than Dolbear's, in order to
 have no more than the single degree of free-
 dom afforded bv the Pigouvian tax rate, one
 needs to specify a fixed rule of distribution.
 We are not arguing that Pigouvian taxes in
 collection and lump sum transfers in distribu-
 tion cannot achieve two policy goals, but we
 wotuld count this arrangement as two policy
 instruments.
 The second consideration is one of in-
 centives. William Baumol has pointed out
 that in the case of no negotiations between
 polluters and pollution receivers (the "nor-
 mal case") the proceeds of the effluent tax
 should not in general be paid to the pollution
 receivers in accordance with their marginal
 suffering. To do so would remove the in-
 centive from pollution receivers from adopt-
 ing defensive strategies which hell) to mini-
 mize the total social cost of pollution.3
 Consequently, even if we wanted to add
 to the Pigouvian tax by fine tuning, its
 disbursement to marginal suffering, the goal
 of compensation would intefere with welfare
 efficienc-. Attempting exact compensation
 would prevent efficiency unless payments to
 pollution sufferers are made conditional upon
 the pollution receivers taking best defensive
 strategies or tinless there are no possible de-
 fensive strategies (the case of "pervasive
 pollution," which is the case in Dolbear's
 model). It is much simpler and more practi-
 cal to use the Pigouvian tax proceeds to lower
 the general tax bill in a diffuse way so as to
 avoid perverse incentive effects in the tax
 distribution.
 Meyer has no rule for distribution of the
 Pigouvian tax proceeds, and without a dis-
 tribution rule his model remains incomplete
 as a general equilibrium model. Apparently
 the lack of a distribution mechanism misled
 Meyer in his test condition. To test whether
 or not per unit Pigouvian taxes can achieve
 exact compensation and efficiency, Meyer
 wrote " . . . one need onlv replace constraints
 (5) [ Ui> U| by equality constraints of the
 form U=N . . . "i (p. 739).
 Mever is manximizing a Lagrangian first
 with inequality constraints and then with
 equality constraints. It can be seen from
 Dolbear's model that either way- this maxi-
 mization leads to a definition of the same
 contract curve (CC' in Figure 1). With neo-
 classical utility functions and a negatively
 sloped utilityT frontier between X and 1,
 there is no need to "waste" extra utility on
 Uy beytond the bare minimum U1. Maximi-
 zation of the Lagrangian will happen on t.he
 boundarv U1"= U1" even if interior solutions
 are allowed. Dolbear's mlodel passes Meyer's
 test and thus the test incorrectly predicts
 that exact compensation is possible. By
 omitting a distribution mechanismii, M\4ey-er
 seems to be confusing conditions for defining
 Pareto optimality (conditions independent
 from distribution mlechanisml) with solutions
 to a general equilibrium model (requiring ta,x
 distribution mechanisms).
 There is an interesting complication. Sup-
 pose that in the presence of externalities the
 utility- frontier bowed otut sufficientlyX so that
 part of the frontier sloped upward as shown
 in Figure 2. Suppose also that CT" corre-
 sponds to B, where no polltution is allowed.
 FI or an elaboration, see Baumol, pp. 309-12. Ronald
 Coase also has the example of farmers who, if they are
 compensated for losses due to sparks fr-om railroad
 trains, have a tendency to plant too close to the tracks.
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 In this case the requirement of exact conm-
 pensation makes welfare efficiencxy imi pos-
 sible. (Mey,er's test would sav that both
 goals are attainable becatuse the Lagrangian
 miiax Ux subject to U">U7 can also be
 maximized on the boundarv U& = U".) How-
 ever, it seenms that externality- bads are imore
 likelv to bow the utilitv frontier in than out.4
 II. Why Exact Compensation in
 Addition to Efficiency?
 Having said this, we raise the qluestion
 why a policy maker would want IPareto op-
 timal Pigouvian taxes to have exact compen-
 station. The point is that whether or not
 exact conmpensation suggests itself as a
 worthy policy goal depends in large part
 uLpon the formulation of the problem and the
 underlying conditions.the formiiulation is try-
 ing to describe. In a benefit-cost anal-sis the
 question of distribution of benefits corre-
 sponds to the question of allocation of
 property rights in a Coasian analysis of ex-
 ternalities. The question of whether or not
 to conmpensate appears synmmetrically. I)em-
 setz would sa\- the (luestion is ethically sy m-
 nmetrical.
 In a Pigouvian formiulation, however,
 the situation appears less synmmetric. In a
 Pigouvian analysis arising fromii the produc-
 tion sector, which is the imiost imiportant
 CaIse, it is natural to treat smoke as just an-
 other factor of pro(luction. For examnple, let
 quantitv Q=f(K, L, S), where K is capital,
 P the price of Q, L is labor, and S is snmok.e.
 Then the effluent tax t is analogous to the
 wage rate, or rental rate. FXor given K = K,,
 L= L we caln draw the marginal reventue
 product of snmoke and illustrate sturpluses,
 as in Fatiure 3. Relative to a zero pollution
 status quo point, effluent tax t leads to a
 producer surplus .1 and consumer surpllus 1B.
 Gliven the practical difficulties of condi-
 tioning and distributing the proceeds B+C0
 to each individucal pollution receiver on the
 basis of his marginal suffering, the question
 arises, why try ?) For another factor of pro-
 duction, say- L, exact compensation amiiounts
 to skimmlling off the labor surplus (corre-
 sponding, to area 13). For laborers, no one
 recomnmends exact compensation which would
 mlake thenm no better off working than un-
 employed. For laborers it is usually con-
 sidered desirable not to interfere with
 laborers' surpluses, when they naturall- ap-
 pear. If we decide that a pollution receiver's
 surplus is not tundesirable, especially since it
 is likelv to be dispersed to consumilers at large
 an(l not just to pollution sufferers, then we
 have no need to search for a second instrui-
 nment to achieve exact compensation, nor to
 berate a Pigouvian tax for not doing two
 things at once.
 I See Bauniol, pp) 316-1 7.
 I It seems obvious that attemp)ting exact compensa-
 tion in the typical case of several polluters an(l millions
 of receivers is attempting an a(lministrative impossi-
 b)ilitv.
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 1II. Convexity
 In most neoclassical models, concave func-
 tions are tused to insture stability and interior
 solutions.6 Althotugh Meyer has not placed
 any conditions on his transfer functions g ,
 the behavior of the gi turns out to be im-
 portant and perhaps counterintuitive. In-
 terestingly, in Meyer's model, convex transfer
 functions g assure interior solutions with
 Pigouvian taxes.
 With UY(B, S), 1V's concave utilitv func-
 tion between bread and smoke, and S- g(H)
 the transfer function, linking smoke to Y's
 heat constumption UY(B, g(H)) may not be
 concave in B and H for concave function g.
 A simple counterexaimple illustrates the
 point. Choose U1(B,S) = B-S as our concave
 function of B and S. For g(H) = H112 = S,
 (1) U(B, g(H)) =B - H"I2
 is not concave in B and H, and the indiffer-
 ence curves bend the "wrong" way. We note
 that if g had been convex, Y's indifference
 curves between bread and heat. would have
 been convex. The desirable convexitv prop-
 erty" of the environmental transfer function g
 can be stated more strongly as follows:
 If U(B, S) is cotncave, U2<O (pollution is a
 ba(d), g(I) =S an increasing, coonvex funclion,
 the z V(1B, H) = UXf (B, g(H)) is concave.
 A little algebra on the minors of
 {Vil V12'
 VV21 V22J
 establishes the proposition.
 In Figure 4(a) the function smoke = gl(heat)
 is concave with respect to its argument heat,
 and the function smoke =g2 (heat) is con-
 vex. Figure 4(b) shows one of Y's indiffer-
 ence curves between smoke and bread.
 It is bent downward in a well behaved way.
 WVith the 450 line, Figure 4(d), this indiffer-
 ence curve is transformed into an indifference
 curve between heat and bread, depending on
 the functional form of g. Sufficiently concave
 g2 leads to indifference curves bending up in
 Figure 4(c). The shear transformation be-
 tween Figures 4 and 5 leaves the indifference
 curve convexities the same. Superimposed on
 Figure 6, Dolbear's Edgeworth triangle, Y'
 has the same tvpe of convexity as indiffer-
 ence curves of consumner X, a situation lead-
 ing to corner solutions.
 What one thinks about the convexity of
 actual transfer functions depends partly on
 where one cuts off the transfer. For example,
 if S=g(H) describes street level densities of
 smoke as a function of heat emissions, we
 mav consider g nearlxN linear. But if S= g(H)
 describes health damage as a function of heat
 emission, the function may be convex, due to
 diminishing returns to biological defenses.
 Important policy implications follow from
 the degree of convexitv of the environmental
 transfer functions. The more concave are the
 g, the more likelyN we are to recommend all
 or nothing policy prescriptions. Suppose, for
 example, water pollution damage functions
 are concave. Then we may want some rivers
 to be trout-clean and some to be industrial
 sewers. If the damage function is convex, it
 is more likely that a little pollution in all
 rivers is a better policy. For more convex
 damage functions, interior (i.e., mixed) solu-
 tions are more likelIy than corner solutions.
 Similar considerations apply to the question
 of whether smoking should be permitted
 throughout a bus or whether it should be
 segregated to one end.
 Robert Kohn has investigated another
 situation which also may lead into all or
 nothing policy prescriptions, p. 994. Suppose
 the S in f(K, L, S) is a vector S= (Sl, S2).
 The two factors of production may be suffi-
 ciently joint so that an optimal standard for
 both may be reached by specifying a required
 standard for just one. Kohn showed that this
 problem can be analyzed by looking at the
 convexity of isocost curves for abatement. It
 should also be noted that the convexity of
 air pollu'tion damage functions partlIN deter-
 mines whether it is wiser to limit peak epi-
 sodes, by emergency measures, or to em-
 phasize control of the chronic average pollu-
 tant levels.
 6 Michael Farrell has shown that the normally in-
 voked convexity conditions are far stronger than neces-
 sary.
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 At this time there are few empirical studies
 which shed light on the question of convexity
 for g. Using cross-section data on urban
 areas, Lester Lave regressed total mortality
 rate on air pollution variables (minimum and
 maximum two-week averages of sulfates and
 particulates) and sociological variables. With
 both piecewise linear and quadratic specifica-
 tions of the pollution variables, there was
 some evidence that g, here a damage func-
 tion, is concave for long-run air pollution
 effects. The evidence is weak because the
 coefficients are nearly all insignificant and
 the sociological variable, percent over age 65,
 seems to be carrying the equations.
 For cases where the damage function is
 sufficiently concave, the policy prescription
 will be non-Pigouvian. Depending on which
 corner solution is better, pollution should be
 either outlawed altogether or allowed with-
 out any constraint.
 However, we think that in many cases g
 will be convex, due to diminishing returns to
 environmental capacity. For example, con-
 gestion is more than proportional to the num-
 ber of cars on a highway.
 An air pollution study provides a fragment
 of evidence for this second alternative. Page
 estimated the impact of daily levels of sulfur
 dioxide and particulates, in London, along
 with meteorological and psychological vari-
 ables on a measure of perceived health, pp.
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 107-13. The non-linear equation
 (2) H, = do + 1E XiSta-i + 02Vt + et
 was estimated where Ht is the number of
 people who feel worse on day t, St is sulfur
 dioxide on day t1 Vt is visibility on day t, a
 is nonlinearity "stretching" coefficient, X is
 Koyck lag coefficient, and et is the error
 term. The stretching coefficient a was 1.5,
 indicating that this measure of perceived
 health is a convex function of the daily
 sulfur dioxide load. In another approach the
 same linear equation of health as a function
 of pollution and meteorological variables was
 estimated for y,ears of high, medium, and low
 pollution. Decline in the pollution coefficients
 from the high to low years also suggested a
 convex damage ftunction for pollution vari-
 ables.
 Most likely, transfer functions exist in a
 varietNy of forms, from concave to convex.
 While little has been done empirically to
 estimate transfer functions, from pollution
 sender to suffering receiver, this is an area
 ripe for econometric work. It is also an area
 ripe for theorists, for the relation of transfer
 functions to changes in location of receivers
 and senders lies at the heart of the external-
 itv problem, especially for the most interest-
 ing case of large numbers of polluters and
 receivers.
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